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Abstract 
 
 Nowadays, Online Social Networks (OSNs) are popular websites on the internet, which millions of users 
register on and share their own personal information with others. Privacy threats and disclosing personal 
information are the most important concerns of OSNs’ users. Recently, a new attack which is named 
Identity Cloned Attack is detected on OSNs. In this attack the attacker tries to make a fake identity of a real 
user in order to access to private information of the users’ friends which they do not publish on the public 
profiles. In today OSNs, there are some verification services, but they are not active services and they are 
useful for users who are familiar with online identity issues. In this paper, Identity cloned attacks are 
explained in more details and a new and precise method to detect profile cloning in online social networks 
is proposed. In this method, first, the social network is shown in a form of graph, then, according to 
similarities among users, this graph is divided into smaller communities. Afterwards, all of the similar 
profiles to the real profile are gathered (from the same community), then strength of relationship (among 
all selected profiles and the real profile) is calculated, and those which have the less strength of 
relationship will be verified by mutual friend system. In this study, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of 
proposed method, all steps are applied on a dataset of Facebook, and finally this work is compared with 
two previous works by applying them on the dataset.  
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1.Introduction 
 
Social network websites are defined as web services that allow users to make public and semi-
public profiles in a bounded system, to build a list of users with whom have a kind of common 
relationship, and to search in their friends’ lists [1]. One of the most important challenges of 
observing friends’ information is threatening users’ security and privacy. An adversary can cause 
many problems by exploiting users’ information. This data may contain users’ financial 
information which adversary can use them to do identity theft attacks, or may contain users’ 
medical background such as healthy status, diagnosis or treatment records [2].  
 
Recently, a new kind of attack which is named Identity Clone Attack is detected on OSNs that 
makes fake identities of specific users. The basic goals of the adversary in this attack are 
obtaining victim’s friends’ personal information by forging real user profile, and increasing trust 
among mutual friends to do more defrauding in the future [3]. Two kinds of these attacks are 
already defined: first one is Single-Site Profile Cloning, and the next one is Cross-Site Profile 
Cloning. In the first attack, adversary forges the real user profile in the same social network and 
use this cloned profile to send friend request to users’ friends. An unaware user may think this 
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request is from a familiar user hence she/he will confirm it and his/her personal information will 
be accessible for adversary. The next attack is cross-site profile cloning, as it shown in Figure1, 
the adversary detects a user with his/her friends in network A, then make a clone profile with 
his/her attributes in network B which user has not made account yet. The adversary sends friend 
requests to the victim’s friends in network B. Victim’s friends think they know the sender of 
requests and confirm them, and as soon as they confirm the request, the adversary will thieve their 
personal information. The adversary uses this information to make other clone profiles or to 
deceive others in the future. Detecting this kind of attack is very difficult for service providers 
and profiles owners, because service providers think it is a new user which is registering in these 
websites [4]. Discovering cloned profiles with more precise methods can bring more security for 
users who are using social networks, and also cause an increasing movement for service providers 
to improve their security level in the services they provide on their platforms [5].   
 
Figure 1. Single-site profile cloning and cross-site profile cloning attacks [5] 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2,a short review on related works are 
expressed and section 3 presents the proposed method for detecting cloned profiles in complete 
details. In section 4, to evaluate the applicability of proposed method, it is applied on a dataset of 
Facebook and it is also compared with previous works in section 5. Finally, in section 6, the paper 
is concluded and some feasible future works are discussed. 
 
2.Related Works 
 
Many social networks have a weak user to user authentication mechanism that are mostly based 
on presented information such as name, photos, and a set of social links. This causes the misuse 
of profile cloning attack to make fake social links. Bhumiratana in [6] presented a model to 
exploit of available weak trust in social networks. This model saves the authority of an online 
fake identity which made by profile cloning attack to obtain more personal information. This 
research proposed an attack methodology to use cloned profiles and to do reliable interactions 
among selected users. Proposed model uses an array of attacking techniques to make a permanent 
and automatic cloned identity of real users on social networks so that are able to get personal data 
in a specific period of time. This proposed system works among different social networks. 
 
Jin et al. in [7] proposed an active detection framework to detect cloned profiles.An intelligent 
fake identity not only forges users' attributes, but may add victim's friends into his friend network 
too. According to similarity of attributes and users' friend list there are two ways for defining 
similarity measure among real identity and fake identities. One of them is basic profile similarity 
and the next one is multiple-faked identities profile similarity. In this research, according to the 
similarity of profiles, a framework for detecting cloned profiles on social network is proposed 
which contains of three steps: first step is to search and separate identities as a set of profiles, as 
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the entry of search is a profile attributes. Second step is detecting suspicious profiles by using 
profile similarity schemas, and third step is deleting cloned profiles from friend list. In detecting 
process adjusting a set of parameters can help to do a correct detection in different social 
networks.  
 
Kontaxis et al. in [8] offered a tool which is able to automatically search and detect cloned 
profiles in OSNs. The concept key of their approach is using user-specific data which is extracted 
from real user profile in social network. In this approach, finally a list of profiles which are 
probably cloned with similarity scores is presented to user. A string matching algorithm is used to 
define the similarity of attributes between two profiles and assign similarity score for each 
candidate identity. In this method detecting cloned profile contains three steps as follows: 
information Distiller, profile hunter, and profile verifier. 
 
Gani et al. in [9] discussed a piece of work which intends to provide some insights regarding the 
resolution of the hard problem of multiple identities detection. Based on hypothesis that each 
person is unique and identifiable whether in its writing style or social behavior, they proposed a 
framework relying on machine learning models and a deep analysis of social interactions, towards 
such detection. 
 
Most of the current research has focused on protecting theprivacy of an existing online profile in a 
given OSN. Instead, Conti et al. in [10]noted that there is a risk of not having a profile in the last 
fancysocial network. The risk is due to the fact that an adversary maycreate a fake profile to 
impersonate a real person on the OSN.The fake profile could be exploited to build online 
relationshipwith the friends of victim of identity theft, with the final target ofstealing personal 
information of the victim, via interacting onlinewith the friends of the victim. 
 
3. The proposed approach 
 
The detection approach is organized in 6 steps as follows: 
 
3.1. Discovering community the social network graph 
 
In many social networking sites, network topological structure and attributes values are the 
complete information. Nodes represent users and edges represent the relationship among them. In 
each node, there are some attributes such as name, gender, education, interests, location and 
social activities. It is obvious that network topological structure and attribute information can be 
used to identify some hidden patterns in communities. In this study, IAC clustering algorithm [11] 
is applied to detect communities in social network graphs. Figure 2 shows a pseudo code of the 
algorithm where it accepts an attribute augmented graph and return a clustered graph as output. 
 
Figure 2. IAC Clustering Algorithm [11] 
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An augmented graph is a graph G = (V, E, ), where V = {v1, v2, v3, …,vn } is the set of nodes 
and n = |V| denotes the number of nodes in the graph, E ⊂ V× V is the set of edges,E = {(vi, vj): 
vi, vj∈V}, and ∈ R|v| × dis the nodes attribute matrix. First of all, the algorithm creates the 
similarity matrix C, then according to K (K = × E) it adds the set of edges to the graph and the 
elements which belong to these edges are set to 1 in matrix S. As well as matrix W is made by 
summation of S and A. To this end, a weighted graph is clustered by MCL algorithm that is 
demonstrated in Figure 3. MCL is a clustering algorithm [12] based on stochastic flows on the 
graph and in order to execute it, first, transition matrix should be made from weighted graph 
obtained through matrix W. This algorithm includes expansion and inflationoperations on 
stochastic matrixes such that the expansion is calculated as M×M and the inflation increases the 
M’s elements to amount of r (r > 1), then normalizes each column. Eq. 1 indicates how the 
inflation operation works, after normalizing the summation of each column will be 1.  
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
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∑ 

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                                      (1) 
MCL is started from a standard flow matrix and the two operations apply it alternatively until the 
output matrix gets a stable state and it will not be changed when the operations are applied again.  
After,allof clusters are determined in the rows of the stable matrix. 
 
 
Figure 3. MCL clustering algorithm [12] 
 
3.2.Extraction user’s attribute 
 
In this stage, the user’s information is extracted from his/her legitimate profile in online social 
network. At the start, the user’s profile is analyzed then it is specified that which parts of user’s 
profile can be regard as user-specific. This information is used to construct queries in search 
engines of social networks. The extracted information is includes name, gender, location, 
education, email and etc. social networks owner and service provider have complete access to 
users’ data and can exploit user-specific from her/his profile easily. 
 
3.3.Search in community 
 
In step1, the socialgraphwasclusteredconcerning to users’ attribute similarities. In this stage for 
finding similar profiles to real user’s profile, the cluster which is belong to real user is marked 
then all of similar profiles are searched by name attribute. The search result is the list of profiles 
with similar or same name to real profile. 
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3.4. Selecting profile 
 
In this stage, the profiles which have mutual friends with victim (real profile) are picked up 
among founded profiles in step 3. Mutual friends are the friends who exist in the victim’s friend 
list and in the friend list of each candidate profile in the same time. Since, in profile cloning 
attacks many friend requests are sent to victim’s friends, it is obvious they have some common 
friends with victim [4].  Hence, only profiles which have mutual friends with victim are chosen 
for continuing next steps.  
 
3.5. Computing strength of relationship 
 
In step 5, all of nodes’ edges which was acceded in this stage, are weighted considering to the 
number of common active friends, shared Urls and page-likes among users. Formally, the social 
network can be defined as a weighted graph G = (V, E, W), where V is the set of profiles, E ⊆ V 
× V is the set of edges, and W ⊆ℜ  is a set of weights are assigned to edges. For each node v ∈ V, 
a 3-dimentional feature vector is defined as it is included in the number of active friends, page 
likes and common shared URLs. Therefore, weight of each edge eij = (vi ,vj) is calculated as 
summation of common actives friends, page likes and common shared URLs between nodes vi 
and vj. Further details presented how the weights can compute come in the following parts [13]. 
 
3.5.1 Active friends: 
 
This measure takes the interaction frequency of a user with his/her friends in the network. For a 
user Vi with Fi as the set of friends, the set of active friends Fia can be computed as an interaction 
between the set Fi and the set of friends of Vi who were either contacted by Vi or those who 
interacted with Vi through wall posts, comments or tags. It can be defined using Eq. 2 in where Ii 
is the set of users with whom Vihas interactions in the network. For a node Vi the value of the 
“active friends” feature is taken as the cardinality of the set of its active friends Fia. Similarly, the 
set of common active friends in the network with whom a pair of users vi and vj have interacted is 
calculated as the intersection of their active friends Fia and Fja , respectively, as given in Eq. 3. For 
an edge eij = (vi ,vj), the value of the “active friends” feature is taken as the cardinality of the set 
of common active friends Fija[13]. 

 	   (2) 

 	 
  
(3) 
3.5.2 Pages-likes:  
 
This feature computes the page likes frequency of the users in social network. For an edge eij = (vi 
, vj), the common page likes of vi and vj, Pij, is calculated as the interaction of the sets of page 
likes of vi and vj, as given in Eq. 4, and the page likes attribute value is calculated as the 
cardinality of the set Pij[13]. 
 	   (4) 
3.5.3 URLs: 
 
this feature captures the URL sharing patterns of the social networks users. For an edge eij = (vi 
,vj), the common URLs of vi and vj, Uij, is calculated as the intersection of the set of URLs shared 
by vi and vj. The URLs attribute value is calculated as a fraction of URLs commonly shared by 
them using Eq. 5 [13]. 
 	  


           (5) 
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On the basis of the above mentioned features, each edge eij = (vi ,vj), is assigned a weight w(eij) 
that is calculated as an summation of the individual feature value as given in Eq. 6. ||represents 
the cardinality of the set [13]. 
 
 ! 	  |
 | " | | " | |                         (6) 
 
Afterward, the weights are assigned to each edge in social network graph and strength of 
relationship is calculated between two nodes as follows: 
 
3.5.4 Definition 1 (Friendship Graph) [14]  
 
Given a social network G and a node v ∈ G.N, the friendship graph of  v, denoted as FG (v), is a 
sub-graph of G where: (1) FG(v).N = {v}  {n ∈ G.N | n ≠ v, ∃  e ∈ G.E, e = <v, n> }; (2) 
FG(v).E = {e  =  <v, n>∈ G.E | n ∈ FG (v).N}  {e = <n, n′>∈ G.E | n, n′ ∈ FG(v).N } 
 
3.5.5 Definition 2 (Mutual Friends Graph) [14] 
 
Given a social network G and two nodes v, c ∈ G.N, the mutual friends Graph of v and c, denoted 
as MFG(v, c), is a sub-graph of G where: (1) MFG(v, c).N = {v, c}  {n ∈ G.N | n ≠ v, n ≠ c, ∃ e, 
e′∈ G.E, e = <v, n>∧ e = <n, c> }; (2) MFG(v, c).E = {e = n, n′ ∈ G.E | n, n′ ∈ MFG (v, c).N} 
 
For instance, Friendship graph of node 7 and mutual friends graph of 7 and 12 are shown in 
Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4. Friends and mutual friends graphs 
 
3.5.6 Definition 3 (Strength of relationship between two nodes)  
 
Given a social network G and two nodes v, c ∈ G.N, Let T = {MFG(v, c).E }, R = { FG(v).E }, P 
= {FG (c).E }. Strength of relationship between v and c is defined in Eq.7 as follows: 
 
&'(), +, 	  
∑ -..∈/
∑ -..∈0 1 ∑ -.2.2∈3
                                      (7) 
 
Strength of relationship (SR)measure is calculated between each suspiciousprofile which 
hasmutual friends with victim. Inasmuch as an expert adversary attempts to make less suspicious 
by making social relationship and interactions with victim’s friends. Strength of relationship 
measure is used to detect cloned identities because the real identities make more deep social 
activities than them as they mostly know each other in real life. They might get intimacy through 
relationships in real life or voice and video chat on the Internet for a while [15]. Therefore, real 
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users contribute in social activities like commenting, sending message and tagging more than 
fakes and clearly they have higher SR comparing to cloned profiles. In the rest of this stage, 
nodes are sorted in a list by amount of SR as RS (v, c1) < RS (v, c2)<RS (v, c3) <…<RS (v, cn) 
and n is the number of profiles which have reached in step 5. Among these profiles, c1 has the 
least SR and it will be sent to next step for verifying. If it does not identify as a cloned identity the 
next one in the list, c2 will be gone to stage 6. This trend will be continued until the last profile in 
the list.  
 
3.6. Decision making 
 
Heretofore, some methods were presented to verify the suspicious identity in online social 
networks. In a primary approach, the ID number is asked from users for verification process. For 
example Identity Badge wants users to enter their passport number [16]. The social verification 
approach is presented by Schechter et al. [17] want users to design some questions to verify their 
friends and if a user answers most questions correctly he/she will be marked as a valid user. A 
proposed approach is verifying suspicious identities by mutual friends as it is wanted mutual 
friends to design some question concerning to background knowledge that they have obtained 
during their relationships. As well as these questions can be design by some social engineering 
teachings. It is evident that a cloned identity cannot answer the question correctly, specially the 
questions which are designed considering to users’ background. Also similar identities (are not 
fake) send their own answers which are understandable for mutual friends as they come from real 
identities. Eventually, fake identities are identified and they remove or closed temporary by 
service provider as well as their friends receive some notification for existence a fake identity in 
their friend list. Figure 5demonstrates a view of proposed verification system. 
 
Figure 5. Verification system by mutual friends 
 
The diagram of detection approach is shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. IAC Detection Approach 
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4.Experimental Results 
 
In order to evaluate the proposed approach, an office dataset of Facebook users [18] is used and it 
is updated by adding user’s attributes, shared Urls and page-likes. Verification the proposed 
approach is not possible for a normal social network user because only service providers 
haveaccess to users’ original information and social network graph.Also some social networks 
have restrictions thus normal users cannot make clone profile easily [4]. There are 63,731 users in 
this dataset and 1,634,115 links among them thus each user has 25.6 relationship links on 
average. To evaluate the approach, it is assumed that there are some fake identities in this dataset 
and it is necessary to add themto dataset as victims. For demonstrating the detail of effectiveness 
of proposed approach, 20 users are selected from the dataset as their social graph is shown in 
Figure7 and their attributes are exhibited in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. 20 users’ attributes selected from dataset 
 
ID Name Gende
r 
Education Work 
Birthd
ay 
Locatio
n 
Relatio
nship 
School Degree Employe
r 
Position 
32 NikoP
arda 
Femal
e 
Harvard University PhD East Man Manager 1979 USA Single 
35 
Sara 
Abraha
m 
Femal
e 
Arcadia University Master’s Owens Web Developer 1980 USA Single 
36 Sara Abraha 
Femal
e 
Carolina University Master’s Owens Web Developer 1980 USA Single 
174 David 
Ernox 
Male Michigan University Master’s Qpass Java Developer 1984 USA Single 
463 Sara 
Abram 
Femal
e 
Michigan University Master’s AppNet Web Developer 1985 USA Single 
1236 Tom Banho Male Acaedia University Bachelor Xing 
Network 
Manager 1979 USA Married 
2411 Rose Milan 
Femal
e 
Koln University PhD Axvert Manager 1972 USA Single 
33 HanrryDabuo Male Dublin High school Diploma Sonic Secretary 1970 UK Married 
34 
Rosa 
Morad
a 
Femal
e 
Franklin High 
school Diploma Sonic Bookkeeping 1974 UK Married 
163 CharlsSelvin Male 
Pietersburg 
University Bachelor Sony Accountant 1979 UK Married 
4013 SeolDi
ao 
Male Chester University Master’s Maxtor Database Administrator 1983 France Single 
4014 Lore Parsan 
Femal
e 
Pietersburg 
University Bachelor Sonic 
Database 
Administrator 1982 Spain Single 
4023 Caroli
n Wolf 
Femal
e 
Franklin High 
school Diploma Sony Bookkeeping 1979 
German
y 
Married 
1081 
Alex 
Monat
a 
Male Lowa University Master’s Sony Electrical 
Engineer 1986 UK Married 
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37 Silvia Jacson 
Femal
e 
Carolina University Bachelor MySpace Computer Data Clerk 1978 
Australi
a 
Married 
1187 
Shery
Monat
en 
Femal
e 
Dublin High school Diploma MySpace Buyer 1968 Australi
a 
Single 
1195 Melina Diyana 
Femal
e 
Pietersburg 
University PhD MySpace 
Call Center 
Assistant 1989 
Australi
a 
Single 
1234 LinaEghose 
Femal
e 
Gabelino High 
school Diploma Amgen Buyer 1980 Canada Single 
1235 
Mariya
naPlan
ta 
Femal
e 
lowa University Bachelor Amgen Electrical 
Engineer 1987 Canada Single 
1237 Toney Cazola Male Carolina University Bachelor Amgen 
Call center 
Operator 1978 Canada Single 
 
 
Figure 7.20 users’ social graph 
 
As mentioned before, an active friend is a friend who posts on the wall, comments and tags on 
her/his friends’ posts. This relationship is shown in green lines in Figure7.  
 
4.1. Testing the IAC approach on dataset 
 
All of detection steps (6 steps) are applied to users of dataset as well as it is supposed that they do 
not use any particular privacy setting. 
 
4.1.1.Choosing a victim identity 
 
Initially, a user is selected as a victim identity from dataset. As it is mentioned in section 1, an 
attacker makes a fake identity considering some acceptable information of a real identity which 
he/she has already gathered from online social networks or other sites. Attacker uses this victim to 
reach his goal by connecting to victim’s friends [4].User 35 is chosen as a victim because it has 
some perquisites as the number of links (edges) and social activities (green edges) in the network. 
Therefore a victim identity 35′ is created and its attribute values are displayed in Table 2 and 
Figure 8 demonstrates its position in social graph in red color. 
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Table 2. 20 users’ attributes selected from dataset with fake identity 
 
ID Name Gender 
Education Work 
Birthday Locati
on 
Relations
hip 
School Degree Employer Position 
32 NikoParda Female Harvard University PhD East Man Manager 1979 USA Single 
35 Sara Abraham Female 
Arcadia 
University Master’s Owens Web Developer 1980 USA Single 
35′ Sara Abraham Female 
Arcadia 
University Bachelor Owens Web Developer 1980 USA Single 
36 Sara Abraha Female Carolina University Master’s Owens Web Developer 1980 USA Single 
174 David Ernox Male Michigan University Master’s Qpass Java Developer 1984 USA Single 
463 Sara Abram Female Michigan University Master’s AppNet Web Developer 1985 USA Single 
1236 Tom Banho Male Acaedia University Bachelor Xing 
Network 
Manager 1979 USA Married 
2411 Rose Milan Female Koln University PhD Axvert Manager 1972 USA Single 
33 HanrryDabu
o 
Male Dublin High 
school Diploma Sonic Secretary 1970 UK Married 
34 Rosa 
Morada Female 
Franklin High 
school Diploma Sonic Bookkeeping 1974 UK Married 
163 CharlsSelvin Male Pietersburg 
University Bachelor Sony Accountant 1979 UK Married 
4013 SeolDiao Male Chester University Master’s Maxtor 
Database 
Administrator 1983 France Single 
4014 Lore Parsan Female Pietersburg 
University Bachelor Sonic 
Database 
Administrator 1982 Spain Single 
4023 Carolin Wolf Female Franklin High 
school Diploma Sony Bookkeeping 1979 
Germa
ny Married 
1081 Alex Monata Male Lowa 
University Master’s Sony 
Electrical 
Engineer 1986 UK Married 
37 Silvia Jacson Female Carolina University Bachelor MySpace 
Computer Data 
Clerk 1978 
Austral
ia Married 
1187 SheryMonat
en 
Female Dublin High 
school Diploma MySpace Buyer 1968 
Austral
ia Single 
1195 Melina Diyana Female 
Pietersburg 
University PhD MySpace 
Call Center 
Assistant 1989 
Austral
ia Single 
1234 LinaEghose Female Gabelino High 
school Diploma Amgen Buyer 1980 
Canad
a 
Single 
1235 MariyanaPla
nta 
Female lowa University Bachelor Amgen Electrical 
Engineer 1987 
Canad
a 
Single 
1237 Toney Cazola Male 
Carolina 
University Bachelor Amgen 
Call center 
Operator 1978 
Canad
a 
Single 
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Figure 8.  20 users’ social graph with a fake identity 
 
4.1.2. Initializing  
 
As mentioned in section 3-1, it is necessary to initialize  before performing the experiments on 
thedataset. Attribute augmented edges are chosen among the top K similar pairs of matrix C 
where K =  × |E|.  The higher mount  is gotten, the more edges are added to each community 
thus more accurate clusters are formed on the social graph. At the beginning,  is set by 0.68 (K = 
34) then it will be set by other values in section 4-2. 
 
4.1.3.Discovering communities in social graph 
 
After performing IAC algorithm on dataset, the attribute augmented graph and clustered graph 
with three communities C1, C2 and C3are gained so that isshown in Figure 9 and Figure 10 
respectively. 
 
Figure 9. Attribute augmented graph 
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Figure 10.Clustered graph by IAC algorithm 
 
4.1.4. Extracting victim’s attributes 
 
The information of victim (who wants to detect his clones) is extracted in this step and it shown in 
Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Real user’s attributes 
 
ID Name Gender 
Education Work Birthda
y 
Location Relationshi
p School Degree Employer Position 
35 Sara Abraham Female 
Arcadia 
University Master’s Owens 
Web 
Developer 1980 USA Single 
 
 
4.1.5.Searching in Community 
 
Since node 35 is belong to C1, only in this community is search for finding similar profiles to 35.  
The searchresult is shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4.Similar users to 35 
 
ID Name Gender 
Education Work Birthd
ay Location Relationship School Degree Employer Position 
35′ 
Sara 
Abraha
m 
Female Arcadia University Bachelor Owens 
Web 
Developer 1980 USA Single 
36 Sara Abraha Female 
Carolina 
University Master’s Owens 
Web 
Developer 1980 USA Single 
463 Sara Abram Female 
Michigan 
University Master’s AppNet 
Web 
Developer 1985 USA Single 
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4.1.6. Selecting apt identities 
 
According to profile cloning attacks, an attacker aims victim’s friends and sends them friend 
requests hence a cloned profile will have some victim’s friends in its friend list [29]. Node 463 is 
not a clone identity because it is connected to node 35 directly and only 36 and 35′ are passed to 
next step. 
 
4.1.7. Computing strength of relationship 
 
In this step, SR is calculated for node 35′ and node 36 in regard to Eq. 2,3,4,5,6,7 then they will 
be ordered by values: 
 
SR (35, 35′) = 14.497 
SR (35, 36) = 36.85  
 
As it is shown amount of SR (35, 35′) is less than other and first it will be sent to next stage for 
verification.  
 
4.1.7. Verification 
 
In this part, nodes 2411, 32, 1236, 174 (mutual friends between 35 and 35′) are asked to design 
some technical questions concerning the relationship background. Node 35 cannot answer the 
questions due to lack of knowledge about users pervious activities and it is marked as clone 
nodes. 
 
4.2.The role of  to constructing communities  
 
In this section, the  is set by some other values as represent in Table 4. For example when =1, 
the number of augmented edges will be |E|. The clustered graphs with changing areshown in 
Figure11. If  is increased and the form of clustering does not change, it means that the default 
value for  was correct and most similar users are in each community.  
 
Table 5. Different values of  
 
 K 
0.68 34 
0.78 39 
0.88 44 
1 50 
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Figure 11. The different graphs with different  
 
For indicating the role of  to construct communities with similar members, a similarity rate in 
cluster parameter is defined as follows: 
 
&45467849: 879! 4; +6<=9!8 	  
><5?!8 @A 7B<5!;9!C !CB!= 4;  +6<=9!8
><5?!8 @A !CB!= 4; +6<=9!8
 
 
Figure 12. Similarity rate in community 
 
The similar rate in clustersfor C1, C2 and C3 in Figure 10, is indicated in diagram of Figure 12. 
According to diagram, through increasing the value of  the most accurate clusters are obtained in 
the light of similar members. 
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5. Evaluation 
 
In order to demonstrate the accuracy of IAC approach,first two parameters are defined as follows: 
 
True positive (TP): Number of clone nodes that are identified as fake nodes  
False Positive (FP): Number of real nodes that are identified as fake nodes 
 
Next, some other clone nodes are added to dataset and IAC approach is applied on. As shown in 
Figure 13, for all numbers of fake nodes, the mount of TP is higher than FP. 
 
 
Figure 13. TP and FP for clone node detection 
 
With the intension of comparing IAC approach to previous approaches,all of three previous 
approaches are applied on the dataset. As diagram in Figure 14shows, in previous approaches the 
mount of their TP is less than the TP of IAC approach and also the mount of their FP is more than 
the FP of IAC approach. Hence our approach can detect fake nodes more accurate than others.  
 
Figure 14.Comparing three exiting approaches 
 
6.CONCLUSIONS 
 
Newly, social networks became a significant part of people normal life and the most internet users 
spend their times on. Alongside many useful applications they have some other aspects which are 
growing by hackers, hustlers and online thief. In this paper, an approach was suggestedfor 
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detecting cloned profiles depending on users’ similarities and their relationship in 6 steps. It 
should be noted that, although detecting fake identities can stop greater extent of deception in 
future, prevention is better than cure because it is enough for an attacker to observer users’ detail 
once. Therefore, teaching users is a worthy attempt to prevent cloning attacksso that they must 
not accept friend requests when they do not know the sender. With a view to extend the proposed 
approach, it can be developed as a Facebook application which each user can run it on his/her 
profile and also some fuzzy methods can be used to overcome wrongly typedinformation in users 
profiles. 
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